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SHOULD RELIGION SHAPE SCIENCE?
~ilkaelStenrnark

Alvin Plantinga has recently claimed that science is not religiously neutral
because it often contains a naturalist bias. He argues that Christians should
respond by developing their own kind of science (an "Augustinian science"), a
science which is shaped by Christian beliefs and values. I agree with
Plantinga that we can find contemporary scientists who presuppose metaphysical naturalism in their scientific reasoning, but I shall also try to show
that the reasons Plantinga gives why Christians should respond by developing their own kind of science are not convincing. Instead I argue that the best
strategy for Christians and other theists to adopt is to expose naturalist bias in
contemporary science and to maintain that religions or ideologies ought not to
be included among the grounds for accepting or rejecting theories in science.
Moreover, an alternative to both Augustinian science and "Duhernian science"
is developed. I also indicate that some interesting parallels could be drawn
between Plantinga and his idea of an Augustinian science and those who
advocate a science shaped by feminism, Islam, or Marxism.

A number of influential thinkers working mainly within the reformed tradition of Christianity have recently raised serious objections against the
way science is conducted and against the bias they think exists within the
academy against Christian beliefs and values and in favor of what is called
"naturalism," "secular humanism," "secularism" or "nonbelief.'" This criticism has also led some of them to propose an alternative way of doing science, a so-called "faith-informed science," "theistic science" or
"Augustinian science." In this article I shall engage in dialogue with one of
these thinkers, Alvin Plantinga. I shall examine critically his claims that
science is not religiously neutral because we can find a naturalist bias in the
work of contemporary scientists and that Christians should in response
develop a science that is shaped by their own religious commitments.
I. Naturalist Bias in Contemporary Science

According to Plantinga a view that has been popular ever since the
Enlightenment is that "science (at least when properly pursued) is a cool,
reasoned, wholly dispassionate attempt to figure out the truth about ourselves and our world, entirely independent of ideology, or moral convictions, or religious or theological commitments."2 But although this view
has received widespread acceptance, he thinks that it is wrong. The truth
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is instead that science is not religiously neutral. This in a way comes as no
surprise for Planting a because he, following Augustine, believes that
human history is the arena of a great struggle between the City of God
(Civitas Dei) and the City of the World (Civitas Mundi), between "the
Christian community and the forces of unbelief."3 Therefore, science, just
as any other human endeavor, cannot be expected to be wholly neutral
with respect to this clash between opposed worldviews. It is even
excessively naive to think that contemporary science is religiously
and theologically neutral, standing serenely above this battle and
wholly irrelevant to it. Perhaps parts of science are like that: mathematics, for example, and perhaps physics, or parts of physics ...
Other parts are obviously and deeply involved in this battle: and the
closer the science in question is to what is distinctively human, the
deeper the involvement. 4
Much of contemporary science is, however, on the side of the City of the
World and does not serve God's purposes. More specifically, it proceeds
from the assumption of metaphysical naturalism. By "metaphysical naturalism" Plantinga means roughly the view that "nature is all there is: there
is no such person as God or anyone at all like him."s He does not think
that there is a neat recipe for telling which part of science is neutral and
which is not in this contest. But the rule of thumb, Plantinga suggests, is
that its involvement depends upon how closely that part of science is
engaged in the attempt to come to understand ourselves as human beings.
Hence we can expect that much of what goes on in economics, psychology,
sociology and also in biology, especially in sociobiology, proceeds from the
assumption of metaphysical naturalism. Christians must not, therefore,
uncritically accept what the scientific experts say because of the naturalist
bias that is present in much contemporary science. It might be completely
wrong seen from a Christian perspective.
Plantinga gives a number of examples from scientific practice to justify
his claim that science is not religiously neutral. In an article in Science, the
Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon takes for granted that the rational way
to behave is to try to act in such a way that one increases one's personal fitness, that is, to act so as to increase the probability that one's genes will be
widely disseminated in the next and subsequent generations. 6 The problem for biology is, however, that quite a few people do not act so as to
maximize their personal fitness. They behave in an altruistic way. Simon
therefore tries to develop a theory of bounded rationality to explain this
non-rational way of behaving. Plantinga asks if this scientific theory is religiously neutral. His answer is no. Perhaps this is the rational way to
behave if one presupposes naturalism, but it certainly is not if one adopts
instead a Christian point of view. According to Christians, altruistic people, such as Mother Teresa, behave rather in the most rational way since
they actually reflect the unselfishly loving character of God. Therefore, "in
Simon's account of altruism we have an example of a scientific theory that
is clearly not neutral with respect to Christian commitment; indeed, it is
inconsistent with it."7
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Moreover, Richard Dawkins and Stephen Gould, for instance, maintain
that evolutionary theory is not merely the best supported theory of the origin of life, but established fact. In other words, it is virtually certain that
the theory (or at least something approximating it) is true. But the epistemological probability of evolutionary theory depends in part on what you
think about naturalism and theism. Its probability given the empirical evidence is lower according to the views that theists hold than it is according
to the views naturalists typically hold. This is so because evolutionary theory is the only game in town for naturalists, whereas theism is compatible
with it but allows the possibility that God could have created the world in
a different way. Plantinga concludes that "the way in which the theory of
evolution is not religiously neutral is ... that the view in question is much
more probable with respect to naturalism and the [empirical] evidence
than it is with respect to [Christian] theism and that evidence."B
Plantinga quotes Dawkins, Futuyma, Gould, and Simpson claiming that
evolutionary theory has shown or given us reason to believe that our
species is merely accidental, that there was no plan or mind or foresight
involved in it coming into existence. But Plantinga believes that "of course
no Christian theist could take that seriously for a moment" because he or
she knows that human beings are created in the image of God and, therefore, their existence cannot be merely accidental but is a part of God's
plan. 9 Again, science is not religiously neutral because it is inconsistent
with what Christians believe to be true.
Simpson, furthermore, in answering the question "What is man?" maintains that "all attempts to answer that question before 1859 [the year
Darwin's Origin of Species was published] are worthless and that we will be
better off if we ignore them completely."lo But this also is incompatible
with Christian belief. According to Christians, the Bible (which is dated
way earlier!) teaches us that we are created in God's image, that we are sinners who need God's love and redemption, and so forth. So here again we
have evidence that science is not religiously neutral.
Hence it is evident that we can find examples of naturalist bias within
contemporary scientific practice. But how should Christians respond to
this? What should we say in the public debate about what science is and
should be?
II. Different Kinds of Augustiniall Science

Plantinga is not satisfied with merely a Christian criticism of contemporary
science and a disclosure of hidden or unreflected presumptions of naturalism. He wants to go one step further and maintains that"a Christian academic and scientific community ought to pursue science in its own way,
starting from and taking for granted what we know as Christians."ll
Christians should develop what he sometimes calls "theistic science," at
other times" Augustinian science." What is then Augustinian science?
Plantinga writes that "in doing Augustinian science, you start by assuming
the deliverances of the faith, employing them along with anything else you
know in dealing with a given scientific problem or project."12 Christians
should in doing science appeal, when appropriate, to what they know
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about God, or God's activity or to what they know by the testimony of the
Bible and take these beliefs as part of the background with respect to which
the plausibility and probability of scientific theories are to be evaluated.
Christians can employ the basic tenets of Christianity in scientific practice in different ways:
(1) stating and employing hypotheses according to which God does
things directly, of course, but also (2) stating and employing hypotheses according to which he does something indirectly; further, there is
(3) evaluating theories with respect to background information that
includes Christian theism; still further, there is (4) employing such
propositions as human beings have been created in God's image, either
directly or as background, and (5) doing the same for such doctrines
as that of original sin, which do not involve any direct mention of
God at all, and (6) deciding what needs explanation by way of referring to that same background. 13

Hence, the appropriate response to the naturalist bias we can find in contemporary science is to develop a specific Christian way of doing science.
According to this view of science, it is acceptable that Christians start by
assuming the truth of their religious beliefs and employ them together with
everything else they know or at any rate think that they know in dealing
with a given scientific problem. We would thus have within the Academy
at least a naturalist science and a theistic science. Practitioners of naturalist science and theistic science would sometimes say and do the same thing. But
at other times they would not, because their research is shaped by the prior
acceptance of different worldviews. We might have thought that there
could and should be one common science, but instead Plantinga urges us to
accept different worldview shaped sciences within the Academy.
What are we to make of this proposal? Let us, however, before considering this question, acknowledge that Plantinga is by no means alone within the contemporary academy to argue for this kind of conception of the
scientific enterprise, although these people might of course think that science should be shaped by another worldview or ideology than
Christianity. Among our fellow theists we have Muslims who express
similar ideas. They talk about a "sacred science" or an "Islamic science."
Mehdi Golshani, for instance, writes that some people deny that "the idea
of Islamic Science" makes any sense. "They argue that science is an objective and universal enterprise, and it does not depend on any creed or ideology." But Golshani maintains that "this is a naive interpretation of scientific activity and that "Islamic Science," or for that matter, "religious science,"
has relevance at ... [both] the theoretical level and the practicallevel."14
But also among Marxists and feminists can we find views that are strikingly similar to Plantinga's view. The Harvard biologist, R. C. Lewontin,
for instance, writes together with Steven Rose and Leon J. Kamin, that they:
share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially
just-a socialist-society. And we recognize that a critical science is
an integral part of the struggle to create that society, just as we also
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believe that the social function of much of today's science is to hinder
the creation of that society by acting to preserve the interests of the
dominant class, gender, and race. IS
They thus believe in "the possibility of a critical and liberatory science," in
short, (and in a less value-loaded terminology) in a left-wing science. 16
Moreover, Sandra Harding maintains that we should not merely criticize conventional science for being an androcentric science but replace it
with a feminist science, that is, a "knowledge-seeking that is directed by
existing feminist theories and agendas."17 Feminist science is "politicized
research" which is "directed by feminist rather than androcentric goals."IB
Notice on this point the similarity between Helen Longino's advice to feminists and Plantinga's to Christians: Longino writes that "in order to practice science as a feminist ... one must deliberately adopt a framework
expressive of that political commitment"19 and Plantinga that "a Christian
academic and scientific community ought to pursue science in its own
way, starting from and taking for granted what we know as Christians."2o
All of these accounts are then Augustinian in the broad sense that their
advocates maintain that it is legitimate to employ one's faith or ideology in
doing science. They all start with an explicit commitment to a particular
ideology or religion and then argue that it should in a profound way be
permitted to shape the scientific activity. I suggest, therefore, that we call
the generic form of this kind of view of science worldview-partisan science
because it can be maintained also by people who do not see themselves as
Christian theists or theists at all. Thus, feminist science (Harding and
Longino), left-wing science (Lewontin, Kamin and Rose), Islamic science
(Golshani) and Augustinian or theistic science (Plantinga) are different versions of worldview-partisan science.
III. What Options Do We Have?

How should we think about this matter?21 Clearly we face a very difficult
but equally crucial question. Plantinga and these other science critics are
right, I think, in that it is unrealistic to think that no faith or ideological
commitments enter into the fabric of science. As a Christian, I am as worried as Plantinga about the naturalism that often seems to be presupposed
in what many contemporary scientists write and say. The theologian John
F. Haught even thinks that this kind of naturalism or materialism "has
become so intimately intertwined with modern science that today many
scientists hardly even notice the entanglement."22 This form of naturalism
is often called "scientific naturalism." Roughly, it is the view that only science provides us with a reliable path to knowledge and that the only
things that exist are the ones science can discover: matter is what ultimatelyexists. (Scientific naturalism is also sometimes called "scientism.") In
my recent book, Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion, I have tried to make
the entanglement that some evolutionary biologists are involved with
explicit and also tried to distinguish scientific naturalism from what I take
to be proper scientific procedures.'"' In short, I have opted for the view:
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(1) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because it is shaped by
religious or ideological elements.
But notice that if we follow Plantinga's advice we cannot really argue in
that way. This is so because if we as Christians maintain that we should be
entitled to let our religion shape science to such an extent that we find it
appropriate to talk about an Augustinian science, then of course people
who hold a different worldview such as naturalism must be allowed to let
their worldview shape science to a similar degree. Hence, it seems as if
Plantinga must accept that:
(2) Scientific naturalism is proper science. 24

The importance of this point can be illustrated by Plantinga's attempt to
criticize Fredric Crew for "failing to distinguish empirical evolutionary science from a philosophical or religious patina added by those who embrace
metaphysical naturalism," in Crew's review essay "Saving Us from
Darwin."25 Crew responds by saying that what Plantinga really wants is to
replace Darwinism with" Augustinian science" and explains that "this 'science' takes as its starting point what Plantinga calls 'our knowledge of
God'." 26 The issue that Crew probably had in mind but forgot to state
explicitly (in a reply that leaves much to be asked for) is "How could
Plantinga consistently criticize him for not distinguishing between empirical science and naturalist beliefs, if Plantinga thinks it is proper science to
take as scientist one's starting point in Christian beliefs?"
What Plantinga could, of course, consistently complain about and which
goes beyond (2) is that Crew, Dawkins, Simpson and others tend to hide
their metaphysical naturalism and try to sell it as a proper part of public science (that is, as a science that is supposed to be free from religious or ideological commitments), when it is in fact not. Thus, his position might be:
(3) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because the religious or
ideological elements it is shaped by are not made explicit.
However, as soon as Dawkins, Simson and these other scientists have
made it explicit that they are starting from and taking for granted what
they know or at any rate think that they know as naturalists (that God does
not exist, that the only reliable path to knowledge is science, that matter is
all that ultimately exists and so on) and that they are employing this
together with everything else they know in dealing with a scientific problem or project, then it seems that Plantinga cannot demur. But perhaps this
is not quite right either. The reason why is that there is actually one other
way in which Plantinga could maintain that scientific naturalism is not
really science, namely if his complaint were:
(4) Scientific naturalism is not proper science because it is shaped by
the wrong kind of religious or ideological elements.
Scientific naturalism (or feminist science or left-wing science for that mat-
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ter) is not proper science because it does not assume the deliverances of
Christian faith and only this kind of science is what we really should call
"science." I do not think that this is the position Plantinga tries to persuade
us to take, but it is nevertheless a possibility. Actually some feminists seem
close to embracing (4) or something very like it. Harding, for instance,
believes that feminist natural sciences," when developed, would provide
us with " ways to obtain less partial and distorted knowledge of the empirical world" than the conventional natural sciences. 27
As far as I can see, these are the options that are available to us and we
have to make up our mind about which one we should accept.
II

IV. The Regulative Ideal of Science
Plantinga and also these other science critics have given convincing examples of when and how people's ideologies or religions enter into the fabric of
science. So much is clear. However, we need to distinguish between the
issue (A) whether science as it is done today (or in the past) is (or was) free
from ideological or religious considerations and the issue (B) whether science should be or strive to be free from ideological or religious considerations.
Phrased somewhat differently, the term "science" can be used either descriptively or normatively. Either we can mean by "science" the activities that scientists are actually engaged in when developing theories and explanations
(call this actual science), or we could mean the activities that scientists ought to
be engaged in when doing science at its best (call this good science).
Although it may be taken for granted that, for instance, theories sometimes-maybe even often-are accepted by scientists because of politics,
religion, and gender, we may equally wonder whether that ought to be the
case. For example, should we accept political, religious, or gender preferences as valid reasons for accepting or rejecting scientific theories or explanations? The answer of course is not obviously " yes." It is thus not
enough to display cases where we can see that faith or ideology commitments have shaped scientific practice, to refute the idea of a worldviewneutral science. It must also be shown that it is unrealistic or perhaps
undesirable to accept that idea as a regulative ideal for actual scientific
practice. Perhaps this could be done by arguing that there is no way to
institutionalize scientific practice so that it can ensure that theories are
accepted by the scientific community independently of ideological or religious concerns. Or if it is realistic, to argue that it is still better to let science
for some reason be shaped by religions or ideologies.
Moreover, we have to distinguish between those who claim that (C) science in general is or should be influenced by ideologies or religions, on the
one hand, and those who maintain that (D) merely parts of science are or
should be shaped in such a way, on the other. Reflecting the former position, Sandra Harding writes: "When we [the feminists] began theorizing
our experience ... we knew our task would be a difficult one. But I doubt
that in our wildest dreams we ever imagined we would have to reinvent
both science and theorizing itself to make sense of women's experience."2s
A statement like this seems to indicate that at least some feminists think
that the whole scientific enterprise-at least up until the recent develop-
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ment of femIDist science-is ideologically biased. The view is then not that
merely certain scientific programs or theories are expressions of male-gender bias, but that science as a whole is disguised androcentric ideology.
On the other hand, Plantinga writes, as we have seen, that it would be
"excessively naive to think that contemporary science is religiously and
theologically neutral, standing serenely above this battle and wholly irrelevant to it." Nevertheless, he continues in the next sentence: "Perhaps parts
of science are like that: mathematics, for example, and perhaps physics, or
parts of physics ... Other parts are obviously and deeply involved in this
battle: and the closer the science in question is to what is distinctively
human, the deeper the involvement."29 Thus, according to his view, while
not every scientific discipline is religiously neutral, this critique does hold
true for some of them or some parts of them.
If we take into account these two distinctions, we end up with the following list of alternative:
WorldviewNeutral Science
Actual
Science

WorldviewPartisan Science

2

3

1
-_

Good
Science

Partially Worldview-Neutral!
Partisan Science

4

..

------

5

I

6

l
Whether actual science should be understood as characterized either by
positions (1), (2), or (3), is a question that is open to empirical investigation.
But I think that the examples Plantinga and other science critics have given
are sufficient to show that position (1) is no longer tenable. My point, however, is that even if we reject position (1), that actual science is worldviewneutral, we are not forced thereby to accept that science should be worldview-partisan (position 6) or even partially worldview-partisan (position
5). We can still argue that science ought to be free from ideologically or
religious considerations. We can, of course, also make it a matter of
degree, by maintaining that the fewer ideological elements that science
contains the better.
But the cake can also be cut in different ways. One way to distinguish
parts of science from each other is to focus, like Plantinga does, on (E) different disciplines or subject matters. But another is to focus on (F) the ensemble
of activities that scientists whether they are physicists, biologists or sociologists are engaged in when doing science. Scientists qua scientists choose a
research area and problems to solve, develop hypotheses, collect and interpret data; they try to convince their peers to accept their methods and theories; they publish their results in books and journals; they function as peer
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reviewers both when it comes to what articles to publish and what
research projects should be funded; they are involved in the storage and
destruction of material used and in its application; they popularize
research and explain the scientific results to the public; they function as
expert advisers for private firms or governments; they teach and grade student papers, they decide what courses to offer and not to offer; they
encourage/ discourage students becoming scientists, they hire and fire people at their departments and they promote or do not promote a certain
social structure at their institutions, they are engaged in fund raising and in
accepting (and possibly also in rejecting) funds from government agencies,
private companies and foundations. In all these scientific activities ideological or religious considerations could playa larger or smaller role, and it
is something we could encourage or discourage, accept or reject.

V. In What Ways Could and Should Science Not be Religiously Neutral?
We cannot, of course, discuss all of these aspects of scientific practice and
Plantinga seems anyway to be more interested in some of them than in
others. So let us examine those that Plantinga bring to our attention, without forgetting that religions (or ideologies) could shape science in many
other important ways as well. As we proceed it will become more clear
what one exactly could mean when claiming that" science is not/ ought not
be religiously neutraL"
Scientists must first decide what is worth studying, what they want to
spend their time, energy, and their own or other people's money on. One
way of understanding the regulative ideal of science as religiously (or ideologically) neutral is to maintain that it applies to this aspect of the scientific
enterprise. Imre Lakatos writes that in his view "society ... has a responsibility ... of maintaining the apolitical, detached scientific tradition and
allowing science to search for truth in the way determined purely by its
inner life."30 The idea is that science ought to be autonomous in the sense
that the direction of research should proceed undisturbed and not be determined by any ideological or religious interests.
Plantinga thinks that this is wrong. First, and as we have already seen,
many scientific projects starts from and are motivated by naturalism. So in
this sense science is not religiously neutral. Second, the Christian community should not only point this out, but do science in its own way and from
its own perspective, which includes "deciding what needs explanation"
seen from that point of view. 31 He maintains in his advice to Christian
philosophers that "the Christian community has its own questions, its own
concerns, its own topics for investigation, its own agenda and its own
research program."32 So Christians because they are Christians have certain interests and find certain things, but not others, puzzling and thus in
need of explanation. Plantinga claims that this is something we should
accept in scientific practice. Therefore, we should reject the idea that science ought to be religiously neutral in this sense. It is entirely appropriate
that Christians let their religious convictions influence what they decide to
do research on and what questions to ask.
It is clearly the case, I take it, that there are certain things that rich but
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not poor people, white but not colored people, men but not women,
Christians but not naturalists, liberals but not socialists, or vice versa, are
interested in and which will sometimes determine what they as scientists
decide to work on or just as important, what they choose not to investigate
or try to explain. Science in this sense is religiously or ideologically partisan. Should we try to prevent this kind of influence? Not necessarily. The
development of science might sometimes even benefit from it because
some topics, some things in need of explanation, scientists might simply
fail to notice if they share too many interests or have similar ideological
background beliefs. To take one recent example, consider women who
have experienced that the society they are a part of denies them certain
things, like equal opportunity irrespective of gender to be hired for doing a
job they are qualified to do or equal salary irrespective of gender when
doing the same job as men do. If these experiences together with the ideological interest to have the same opportunities as men determine that a
group of female scientists decide to study the question of what causes the
oppression of women, who has a right to complain?
Hence, it seems quite reasonable to allow ideological or religious
motives to guide what kind of research scientists get involved in. But it is,
of course, extremely important that we realize that such a rejection of the
autonomy of science means that ideological interests are in such a situation
allowed to strongly influence what kind of scientific inquiries gets done
and what kind does not. Thus, we should perhaps actively try to promote
a direction of scientific research that takes into account the interests of a
broad variety of groups in our society. Moreover, we ought probably to
try to ensure that the scientific community consists of people with different
ideological or religious backgrounds so that the research topics undertaken
reflect the interests of different groups of people. On this issue we should
go along with Plantinga, although I think that the question is more complex than what we have been able to take into account in this context.
There is another, second way in which Plantinga claims that science is
not religiously neutral. Plantinga writes, as we have seen, that "in Simon's
account of altruism we have an example of a scientific theory that is clearly
not neutral with respect to Christian commitment; indeed, it is inconsistent
with it."33 Positively speaking, this is one of the three ways in which
Plantinga suggests that "a scientific theory can be relevantly related to the
theological or religious claims characteristic of the theistic religions. First, a
scientific theory may be incompatible with those claims."34 Here Plantinga
seems to assume that science is religiously neutral only if it does not refute
or undermine religious beliefs and values. But since that is not the case science is religiously partisan.
This is certainly a possible way to interpret the claim that "science is not
religiously neutral." The problem, however, is that those scholars who
advocate the idea of a science free from religions (or ideologies) do not
think that science is or should be religiously neutral in this sense or at any
rate they should not hold such a view. The reason is simply that science
has over the centuries refuted or undermined numerous religious and ideological beliefs which people have held. Let us recall a few beliefs of relevance to Christianity. Science has discovered that the earth is billions of

344

Faith and Philosophy

years old and thus refuted the religious belief that the earth was created by
God around 6,000 years ago. Religious people have held (and advocates of
flat earth society still do) that the Bible teaches that the earth is flat and that
we therefore ought to believe this. Science has refuted this idea and
replaced a geocentric with a heliocentric worldview. In New Testament
times and all through the Middle Ages many religious believers thought
that people with certain symptoms, whom we today through science have
discovered suffered from mental diseases, were possessed by demons or
evil spirits. Science, furthermore, undermines the religious idea that Homo
sapiens descended from just one couple, Adam and Eve. h, fact, science has
the potential to undermine (or support for that matter) any religious belief
that has empirical content. Here lies also the key to understanding why we
cannot expect that science is (or should be) religiously neutral in this sense,
because investigating empirical claims and developing theories about
empirical states of affairs is what science is all about; it is its proper
domain. If religious or ideological beliefs contain an empirical element or
presuppose the truth of such an element, these beliefs can be undermined
or refuted by scientific theories and data (and they can, of course, also be
supported or verified by scientific theories and data).
Therefore, we should grant that science could be worldview-relevant in
respect to religions or ideologies, while it could at the same time be worldview-neutral in respect to them. Worldview-relevance does not imply
worldview-partisanship. Science, if worldview-neutral, would (on such an
account) belong to neither side in a controversy, say between theism and
naturalism or liberalism and socialism, but could obtain research results
relevant for the truth-claims and value judgments involved in such a controversy. Science would, on the other hand, be worldview-irrelevant if that
were not possible. If so, all scientific research that might yield results,
which are ideologically or religiously controversial in any way, would
need to be abandoned.
The difficulty with Simon's account cannot, therefore, merely be that it
is inconsistent with Christian beliefs; the problem must be elsewhere.
Where? Simon's theory about human docility and limited rationality is
developed as he tells us within the framework of neo-Darwinism to
explain the spreading of altruistic behavior. By "docility" he means the
tendency we can find among humans to accept social influence. He writes,
"Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive others in the
society want them to learn and believe."35 His idea is that "because of the
limits of human rationality, fitness can be enhanced by docility that
induces individuals often to adopt culturally transmitted behavior without
independent evaluation of their contribution to personal fitness."36
"Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be unable
to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from
altruistic behavior."37 For these and some other reasons Simon concludes
that docile persons will necessarily also behave altruistically. But then
does this not mean that the really rational way to behave is to try to
increase one's personal fitness? Is not the assumption underlining Simon's
reasoning that if people were smarter (and perhaps a little less docile) they
would be able to screen this culturally transmitted altruistic behavior and

SHOULD RELIGION SHAPE SCIENCE?

345

instead behave in a (non-bounded) truly rational way? But why think that
altruistic behavior is a manifestation of limited rationality? Why not
instead think, as Plantinga suggests, that it is a manifestation of genuine
rationality? Altruistic behavior is from at least a Christian perspective very
rational because it reflects the character of God. So what is going on here?
I suggest that the reason why Simon may assume that the rational way
to behave is to try to increase one's fitness is that he (consciously or unconsciously) interprets evolutionary theory scientistically. Simon assumes that
neo-Darwinism is the whole story of human behavior. Maybe he shares
with Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson the idea that "morality ... is
merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends" and
"in an important sense, ethics ... is an illusion fobbed off on us by our
genes to get us to cooperate."38 Given this kind of perspective it is also not
particularly surprising that Richard Dawkins writes, "much as we might
wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as a
whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense."39
Because if morality is merely an adaptation put in place to further our
reproductive ends and if one also believes that evolutionary theory provides us with an all-sufficient explanation, what else can practical rationality be than maximizing personal and genetic fitness?
If Simon shares these ideas with Dawkins, Ruse and Wilson then the
problem for Christians who maintain that science should be religiously
neutral is not really that his theory of bounded rationality is inconsistent
with their religious convictions. The difficulty is, more precisely, that his
and other biologists' account presupposes the prior acceptance of a rival
worldview or ideology, namely scientific naturalism. But a Christian can
rightly point out that claims like "only science provides us with a reliable
path to knowledge" and "the only things that exist are the ones science can
discover, that is, matter is what ultimately exists," are not scientific claims
or entailed by such claims and that scientific inquiry can without any problems whatsoever be conducted without making these kinds of epistemological and metaphysical assumptions.
This means that the regulative ideal of science as religiously neutral is
probably best understood as a claim about what scientific investigation
ought not to presuppose. Science should be religiously neutral in the sense that

it ought not to presuppose the truth of any particular worldview, religion or ideolo-

gy such as Christianity, Marxism, feminism or naturalism. This means, more
exactly, that ideologies or religions ought not to be among the grounds for
accepting and rejecting theories in science. Theories should be accepted by
the scientific community only in the light of considerations that involve
empirical data, other accepted theories and intra-scientific criteria such as
consistency, simplicity and explanatory power. Ideological or religious
considerations are therefore illegitimate ways of deciding between scientific theories. They threaten the integrity of science. The basic idea is that you
do not have to agree on what constitutes a good human life or society,
what a just social order is, what the appropriate differences (if any)
between the genders are, whether God exists and whom God is if God
exists, to be able to evaluate scientific theories properly. The choice of scientific theory should not be determined by moral, personal, ideological or
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religious ideas, but by intra-scientific criteria.
Is it not this that is the real problem also with Simpson's claim-which
Plantinga brings to our attention-that all attempts to answer that question
"What is man?" before Darwin published The Origin of Species in 1859 are
worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely? It is
reasonable to assume that Simpson in telling us these things (and Dawkil1.s
in quoting him approvingly) simply presuppose the truth of scientific naturalism. Only if they take for granted that genuine knowledge can be
obtained solely by employing the methods of science, does it seems reasonable to state in this a priori fashion that all human inquiries of human
nature before the development of Darwinism are simply worthless. Only
by assuming not merely that "Biology after 1859 gives us knowledge of
human nature" but that "Nothing but biology (or the sciences) after 1859
gives us knowledge of human nature" or something along those line can
Simpson and Dawkins as scientists maintain by implication that what
Christians take to be crucial information, namely that we are created in
God's image and that we are sinners who need God's love and redemption, are really worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore these
ideas altogether. But "Nothing but biology (or the sciences) after 1859
gives us knowledge of human nature" and similar pronouncements are of
course not something that science has the means to confirm. On this point
Simpson and Dawkins violate the regulative ideal of science as religiously
and ideologically neutral by assuming the truth of a particular ideology in
their scientific reasoning.
The same analysis can probably be made about the claim-which
Plantinga thinks a Christian cannot take seriously for a moment"'-made
by Dawkins, Futuyma Gould, and Simpson that evolutionary theory has
shown or given us reason to believe that our species is merely accidental,
that there was neither plan nor mind nor foresight involved in its coming
into existence. If all individual species that come into existence through the
process of evolution are random (i.e., have a low probability) with respect
to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or
retrospectively explain and if the only source of knowledge we have is science
(or more specifically evolutionary biology in this case), then perhaps it follows
that we ought to believe that our existence is the result of pure chance or in
other words it is not a part of anyone's plan and serves no one's end. But
this is a scientistic and not a scientific argument because its second premise
assumes the truth of scientism or scientific naturalism. Merely the first
premise, the scientific one, is, however, compatible with the assumption
that God knew before the creation of the world that human beings or at
any rate intelligent life would be the inevitable product of the evolutionary
process and that therefore we (or intelligent life) exist for a reason.
It is therefore somewhat misleading to write that worldview-neutral science, or what Plantinga calls "Duhernian science," "would be maximally
inclusive and wholly neutral with respect to the word-view differences
that separate US."41 On the contrary, worldview-neutral science might
totally undermine a particular ideology or religion if it contains (or presupposes the truth of) many empirical claims that science can show to be false.
The idea is rather that science ought not to grant a privileged status to any par-
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ticular worldview, ideology or religion in the sense of presupposing its truth in the
way, for instance, Marxism was assumed to be true in "Lysenkoian" biology in the Soviet Union or Nazism in Aryan" physics in Germany. It is in
this way, I suggest, that we should understand the idea that Duhemian science (in contrast to Plantinga's Augustinian science) ought not to be ideologically or religiously partisan but neutral.
II

VI. Why Accept Augustinian Science as Good Science?
Plantinga rejects the regulative ideal of science as ideologically or religiously neutral also in this third sense. He maintains, as we have seen, that
Christians as scientists should start from what they think that they know as
Christians. They should in doing science appeal, where appropriate, to
what they know about God, or God's activity or to what they know by the
testimony of the Bible.42 These beliefs ought to be part of the background
evidence with respect to which the plausibility and probability of scientific
theories are to be evaluated. Hence, science should not be ideologically or
religiously neutral in the sense that it should not presuppose the truth of
any particular worldview, religion or ideology such as Christianity,
Marxism, feminism or naturalism.
Again it is well worth pointing out that Plantinga is not alone within the
contemporary Academy in arguing for an Augustinian science or a worldview-partisan science along these lines. For instance, Longino writes,
The idea of a value-free science presupposes that the object of inquiry
is given in and by nature, whereas the contextual analysis [that is, her
own] shows that such objects are constituted in part by social needs
and interests that become encoded in the assumptions of research
programs. Instead of remaining passive with respect to the data and
what the data suggest, we can, therefore, acknowledge our ability to
affect the course of knowledge and fashion or favor research programs that are consistent with the values and commitments we
express in the rest of our lives. From this perspective the idea of a
value-free science is not just empty but pernicious. 43
With this last statement Longino claims that the very idea of a value-free
science and, I assume, also a world view-neutral science, is dangerous and
therefore ought not to serve even as an ideal. On the contrary, scientists
should not merely make their ideological commitments explicit when participating in policy making, religious or moral debates, and so forth, but
they should also interpret the data in such a way that those theories which
guarantee the reinforcement of their own social ideals will be validated.
However, "in order to survive and attract participants" this must be done
in such a way that "some of the standards/values characterizing the scientific community within which it is proposed" are satisfied. 44 Longino
points out that on this issue neo-Marxists (like Lewontin) and radical feminists have a similar view: "the neo-Marxists are understood as advocating
an alternative vision of nature and natural processes largely on moral and
sociopolitical grounds ... .In this regard the neo-Marxists stand on the same
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ground as the feminist scientist. In order to practice science as a feminist,
as a radical, or as a Marxist one must deliberately adopt a framework
expressive of that political commitment."5 Ideological considerations are
thus to be regarded as legitimate constraints on scientific reasoning.
But why should we accept a world view-partisan science, in the sense
that religious or ideological considerations should be allowed to playa
legitimate role in determining which theories scientists ought to accept or
reject? Does Plantinga really given us any good reason why we should
develop an Augustinian science?
What is evident is that he has given us convincing examples of naturalist bias within contemporary science. But, as we have seen, this is not in
itself sufficient to support the idea of an Augustinian science. It is not sufficient because one can still maintain that the appropriate way to respond is
to reject these scientists' ideas once we discover that they are not merely
based on accessible empirical evidence, but depend for their justification
on the prior acceptance of certain ideological convictions. More precisely,
as soon as we discover that scientists accept scientific hypotheses because
they fit their ideological beliefs or values, these hypotheses ought not to be
considered a part of the body of justified scientific theories. Science ought
to be so structured as to discourage scientists from advocating scientific
hypotheses because they fit their ideological or religious convictions. In
good science, scientists should be encouraged to expose-and receive
recognition for exposing-ideological assumptions functioning as control
beliefs for what theories are accepted or rejected by the scientific community. This is, in fact, also what has happen many times in the history of science."; Perhaps Harding and Longino are right that many scientists have
failed to see the extent to which male bias functions as control beliefs in scientific reasoning and perhaps Plantinga is right that the same is true about
naturalist bias in contemporary science. But as long as the scientific community can be constituted in such a way that it contains scientists who
adhere to a great variety of religions or ideologies and these people's voices are not silenced, we can slill, when it comes to the validation of scientific
theories, continue to hold on to the non-Augustianian conception of science as a regulative ideal for scientific practice.
Plantinga seems to anticipate this objection because he admits that a possible response to Dawkins, Simon and other scientists is to maintain that
when they say these things about rationality, purpose, pre-Darwinian ideas
about human nature and so on, then they are not strictly speaking doing
science because their conclusions requires the acceptance of certain extrascientific premises. But his comment is that this "is not really the important
question for my present purposes."4? This is puzzling because he not merely says that his objective is to give examples of naturalist bias in current science, but to "argue that a Christian academic and scientific community
ought to pursue science in its own way, starting from and taking for granted
what we know as Christians."48 But if one can on scientific grounds criticize
Dawkins, Simson and these other scientists by pointing out that they presuppose naturalism in their scientific reasoning, then one crucial reason
why Christians should develop their own kind of science fails. Why develop a theistic science if one can show that naturalist science is not proper sci-
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ence? (The same applies to ferrtinism: why promote a distinct ferrtinist science if one can argue that masculinist science is not proper science?)
Another reason why we should develop an Augustinian science that
Plantinga appears to give is that since we know many important things as
Christians, it would be unwise or unnatural if we accepted a constraint that
did not allow us to use that information in doing science.49 Why should we
not use everything we know in doing science? Notice first-given the distinctions I have made--what, the question concerns. I am not saying that
Christians should not let what they know or at any rate believe that they
know, influence the kind of research topics they undertake or the hypotheses they propose or what already accepted scientific theories they want to
take a second look at. What I am saying is merely that they should not claim

that their Christian convictions ought to be considered a proper part of scientific
theory validation. They ought not to maintain that Augustinian science in
this sense is proper science.
Because if they do, then people of other faiths and ideologies who also
believe firmly that they know particular things as a result of their adherence to these faiths and ideologies can claim that their "knowledge" also
ought to be considered a proper part of scientific theory validation. But
since it seems as if we cannot come to an agreement about which worldview we should accept, we face a choice. We can either choose to (a)
accept a pluralism of worldviews in scientific theory validation or try to (b)
limit their influence as much as we can, and whenever a theory is accepted
because of worldview considerations point this out and thereby disqualify
it as a proper part of the body of scientifically justified theories.
But, of course, it is easier for me and those Christians who are a bit more
uncertain than Plantinga about whether they really know their Christian
beliefs to be true, to accept this. (Those who perhaps understand their
Christianity more in terms of faith, than in terms of knowledge.) But at
any rate the history of science should make even the most convinced
Christians hesitate before maintaining that their convictions ought to be a
proper part of scientific theory validation. For instance, many Christians
have really thought they knew that the Bible taught that the earth was flat,
that the earth was at the center of the universe, and that God created the
different species on earth in a fixed form roughly six thousand years ago,
and for a long time--as we all know-these beliefs hindered the progress
of scientific inquiry. None of Plantinga's reasons why Christians ought to
develop an Augustinian science in this sense are therefore convincing.
In conclusion, the regulative ideal of science we should accept is one where
Christian or naturalist, feminist or masculinist, right-wing or left-wing considerations are not allowed to playa role in determining which theories the
scientific community ought to accept or reject. This holds true even if
Plantinga and others are right that violations of this ideal in the actual life
of scientific inquiry happen more frequently than we have previously
thought. However, this does not mean, and on these points I think
Plantinga is right, that scientists who are Christians should not let what
they believe or know as Christians influence the kind of research topics
they undertake, the hypotheses they develop or what already accepted sci-
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entific theories they want to take a second look at or their views about how
scientific results should be used. We could therefore agree with Plantinga
that "science (at least when properly pursued) is [actually not] a cool, reasoned, wholly dispassionate attempt to figure out the truth about ourselves
and our world, entirely independent of ideology, or moral convictions, or
religious or theological commitments."so But we could still reject an
Augustinian science or a worldview-partisan science, if we by that means a
science in which religious or ideological beliefs and values function as control instances of what theories ought to be accepted or rejected by the scientific community. If we, on the other hand, by an "Augustinian science" or
a "world view-partisan science" merely means a science in which
Christians, Muslims, socialists, feminists and so forth are allowed to let
their worldview convictions influence the kind of research topics undertaken, the hypotheses developed or what already accepted scientific theories
need to be critically scrutinized again (looking for undetected ideological
bias), or how we should use the results of scientific inquiry, then such a science seems to be unavoidable or if avoidable at least acceptable, probably
even desirable. Thus, the position taken here involves a rejection also of a
traditional understanding of the idea of a religiously or an ideologically
neutral science. It provides an alternative to both Augustinian science and
Duhemian science (as Plantinga defines them).51
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